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REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
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“It is seeing which establishes our place in the world; we explain 
that world with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are 
surrounded by it.” 
—JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 1 (Penguin Books 1977) 
(1972). 
INTRODUCTION 
The Founders included the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee, “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion,”1 as assurance that the newly formed democracy would be a 
“just” society.2  Justice, however, is an elusive concept—a reflection of 
society’s changing perceptions.3  Although it may be comforting to 
believe in an a priori definition of justice, and even more comforting 
 
 ∗ J.D., 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2002, Columbia College, 
Columbia University.  The Author would like to thank Professor Marc Poirier for his 
guidance and mentorship. 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment guarantee against taking with-
out compensation is commonly referred to as the Takings Clause and was incorpo-
rated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1897.  Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–41 (1897).  Most states have 
included a similar guarantee in their constitutions, with the few that have not, includ-
ing it by either statute or judicial mandate.  See Marc R. Poirier, Regulatory Takings, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 10A, §§ 10A.20–10A.22[2] (Michael B. Ger-
rard, Esq., ed., 1999) (1992) [hereinafter, Poirier, Regulatory Takings] (table of state 
taking provisions). 
 2 E.g., William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 712 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Treanor, The Origins] (discussing James Madison’s liberalist approach on prop-
erty, noting that for Madison, “[a] government that provided compensation when it 
took real or personal property demonstrated its commitment to personal freedom”). 
 3 See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1714, 1715 (1988) (observing that “since we do not possess infinite wisdom, 
we are unable to make reliable assertions about the content of this conception of jus-
tice”). 
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to believe that such an absolute has been successfully memorialized 
in the Constitution, history provides proof that the concept of justice 
evolves with experience.4  This reality, however, comes into direct 
conflict with the popular, albeit misconceived, belief that property 
rights are absolute.5 
The impetus behind the inclusion of the Takings Clause in the 
Fifth Amendment was the public concern for the potential of majori-
tarian abuse6—and that assurance won would not have meant nearly 
 
 4 See, e.g., id. at 1720 (noting, for example, that “[o]nly 125 years ago, our laws 
incorporated the idea that it was possible for one human being to own another”).  
The accepted function of the Supreme Court as the interpreter of the Constitution, 
acknowledges that words can and do change to reflect the times.  McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it is a consti-
tution we are expounding.”); John Brigham, PROPERTY AND THE POLITICS OF 
ENTITLEMENT 21 (1990) (“The opinions of the Supreme Court . . . . are a running 
commentary on fundamental concepts, and they disclose ideological shift or continu-
ity in the polity.”).  The necessity of change in a functioning government predates 
the founding of the United States.  See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 19 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987) (1790) (“A 
state without the means of some change is without the means of conservation.  With-
out such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the constitution which it 
wished the most religiously to preserve.”).  Furthermore, even in the realm of prop-
erty principles, which have been described as “sluggish, inert, and timid,” id. at 44, 
the necessity for change has been accepted: 
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to 
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sus-
tained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have 
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. . . . In a changing world it is 
impossible that it should be otherwise. 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
 5 E.g., JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise on Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 286, V § 27 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1691) (standing for the 
proposition that the right to property, derivative of the right to life, is an absolute 
and a nonnegotiable element of the social contract).  Notwithstanding the ground-
ing in Lockean philosophy, some commentators have argued that the notion of abso-
lute property rights only became generally accepted after the Supreme Court recog-
nized diminution to investment-backed expectations as a constitutionally imperm-
issible taking.  See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the Rule of Law: Teaching 
Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 731 (2002). 
Early Americans did not recognize these regulations as taking property 
because not all expectation interests were recognized as legal interests 
until the Supreme Court, in a series of late nineteenth-century rate 
regulation cases, constitutionalized the protection of what we now call 
investment-backed expectations.  Put simply, the bag of early modern 
writs did not include one for suing government officials for reducing 
the development potential of land caused by the legislative pursuit of 
moral topography. 
Id. 
 6 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 479 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public Trust 
Doctrine] (“The rationale [for the Takings Clause] is that economic benefits are to be 
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as much if the public did not have faith in the permanence of the 
written word.7  Naturally, admitting that justice is a malleable term 
can result in instinctive unease; but this unease should be dispelled 
by the realization that admitting to the term’s flexibility is not to say 
that the definition of justice can be changed on a whim, capable of 
upsetting the comforting notion of justice as absolute.8  While memo-
rializing a principle in writing guards against dramatic and arbitrary 
change,9 it does not preclude gradual change; for the most part, 
changes in the definition of justice come about through a process 
analogous to evolution—falling beneath the radar of conscious per-
ception.10  It is this fact—that change is so incremental as to be ac-
cepted before there is a general awareness of choice—that maintains 
the assurance of security and even fools some into believing in abso-
 
protected against certain kinds of public acquisitiveness lest the cost of public pro-
gress be unfairly thrust upon certain individuals or groups instead of upon the gen-
eral community which benefits from public enterprises.”); Treanor, The Origins, supra 
note 2, at 712.  In general, one can view all the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights as 
a direct response to the concern that the Constitution did not do enough to safe-
guard individual rights.  This concern was evident even before the adoption of the 
Constitution.  See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (John Hamilton) (responding to 
New York citizens’ concern that the proposed Constitution did not have a Bill of 
Rights). 
 7 E.g., Kraig Odabashian, Comment, Investment-Backed Expectations and the Politics 
of Judicial Articulation: The Reintegration of History and the Lockean Mind in Contemporary 
American Jurisprudence, 50 UCLA L. REV. 641, 643 (2002) (concluding that “[f]or 
Madison, the technology of a written constitution overcomes the uncertainty of an 
evolving political life”). 
 8 See Tideman, supra note 3, at 1715 (giving an alternate explanation to quiet 
society’s unease based on the difficulty of any one definition gaining acceptance). 
 9 See Odabashian, supra note 7, at 643. 
 10 See BURKE, supra note 4, at 53 (“The science of constructing a commonwealth  
. . . is . . . not to be taught a priori.  Nor is it a short experience that can instruct  
us . . . .”); Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 727.  Hulsebosch describes the evolutionary 
theory of informal amendment to the Constitution as one where “not everyone 
agrees on how and when [changes] happen[]. . . . [They] involve[] some mixture of 
time, the assimilation of the regulation’s means into our legal culture, and the regu-
lation’s popular acceptance.”  Id.  See also Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: 
Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6–7 [hereinafter Rose, 
Property and Expropriation] (noting that some expropriations of property are so “taken 
for granted that we barely even notice them”).  Although a definition is sometimes 
changed by governmental fiat—like the emancipation of slaves—those instances are 
few and far between.  Id. at 7 (finding that “rights alterations that accompany revolu-
tions and warfare or other upheavals that create massive overthrowings of existing 
property rights and resource uses” are “extraordinary”); Tideman, supra note 3, at 
1722.  Even in those limited circumstances, such a fiat is the culmination of height-
ened awareness that a previously held notion of justice is in danger of moving out-
side the boundaries of justice.  See United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 
(1952).  For example, when property is lost during a revolution or war, the losses are 
accepted because loss in general is expected.  Id.  (“This Court has long recognized 
that in wartime many losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war . . . .”). 
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lute definitions.11  Furthermore, in many areas of law that are not so 
resistant to change as property law, there is a consensus that rigidity 
in the face of progress does not comport with the illusion of justice.12 
Property rights, a society’s most evident reflection of justice,13 
should also be considered flexible and able to evolve with changing 
expectations—without this flexibility destroying the public’s faith in 
its society’s commitment to justice.14  Indeed, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the need for flexibility in the seminal property case, Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,15 by adopting a balancing 
test between public interests and private interests to determine 
whether a regulation was compensable.16  Unfortunately, the flexibil-
ity introduced into regulatory takings jurisprudence was diminished 
to some extent by Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,17 which re-
placed the balancing test in cases of total economic wipeout with a 
 
 11 CAROL M. ROSE, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE 
HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 273 (1994) [hereinafter ROSE, Seeing 
Property] (“[P]roperty’s brave claims of control and permanence. . . . are often con-
siderably more aspirational than real.”); Rose, Property and Expropriations, supra note 
10, at 6. 
 12 C.f. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985); Ep-
stein v. Gluckin, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (N.Y. 1922).  For example, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware in Unocal, a seminal case in corporate law, recognized the need to create 
new law, in order to comply with the mandates of justice.  Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 
957 (“[O]ur corporate law is not static.  It must grow and develop in response to, in-
deed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs.”); see also Epstein, 135 N.E. at 
862 (contractual remedy case) (“[Where a] formula had its origin in an attempt to fit 
the equitable remedy to the needs of equal justice[,] [w]e may not suffer it to petrify 
at the cost of its animating principle.”); Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 732 (calling for 
a flexible standard of property rights). 
 13 Rose, Property and Expropriations, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that David Hume 
and Adam Smith “identified the recognition of property as ‘justice’ itself”); c.f. 
Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 716 (“From old limits on testamentary transfers to new 
forms of zoning and eminent domain, property law is where our society works out 
conflicts between private right and public will.”). 
 14 See generally, Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2002) [hereinafter, Poirier, Virtue of Vagueness] (arguing 
that “the vague regulatory takings doctrine . . . provide[s] stability, coherence, and 
legitimacy for the ongoing social process of managing resources”).  For a student 
comment that vehemently opposes this view, see Odabashian, supra note 7, at 643–45 
(criticizing the Court for replacing “constitutional text” with “a vague analysis of so-
cial interest that incorporated the notion of investment-backed expectations,” a stan-
dard that could change at the whim of the legislature). 
 15 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 16 Id. at 124.  Use of a balancing test was not new—a predecessor to the Penn Cen-
tral balancing test was promulgated in the Supreme Court that first recognized that 
regulations could constitute regulatory takings.  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
415 (1922).  The history of the regulatory takings doctrine is discussed in more detail 
in Part I.B of this Comment. 
 17 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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bright line rule mandating compensation.18  This Comment proposes 
that flexibility can be reintroduced into the Lucas vein of regulatory 
takings jurisprudence, especially as concerning environmental regu-
lations in coastal lands, by acknowledging and giving due weight to 
the role of visual cues in effectuating public subconscious acceptance 
to change. 
Courtroom battles regarding coastal land regulations provide an 
exemplary stage to showcase changes in public expectations.19  When 
in the late 1960s and 1970s environmental concerns came to the fore-
front of public awareness,20 there was a call to expand coastal land 
regulations—not only through the accepted means of a State’s gen-
eral police power,21 but also by use of an ancient,22 and arguably 
stronger canon of property law—the public trust doctrine.23  The 
 
 18 Id. at 1015. 
 19 See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972). 
Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesirable, 
and not picturesque.  But as the people became more sophisticated, an 
appreciation was acquired that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role 
in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are essential to the pu-
rity of the water in our lakes and streams. 
Id.; see also, Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and 
Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 331 (2004) (stating that “[l]awsuits 
placed the issue [of environmental protection] on the national agenda half a century 
ago, and lawsuits since have prodded it forward over stiff resistance”). 
 20 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007 (“South Carolina’s expressed interest in intensively 
managing development activities in the so-called ‘coastal zone’ dates from 1977 
when, in the aftermath of Congress’s passage of the federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act of 1972 . . . the legislature enacted a Coastal Zone Management Act of its 
own.”); see also Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 6, at 473 (“Public concern about 
environmental quality is beginning to be felt in the courtroom.”). 
 21 For an early review by the Supreme Court of decisions addressing the scope of 
a state’s police powers, see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658–59 (1887) (including 
within the scope of state police powers regulation of a state’s “domestic commerce, 
contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and acts upon internal mat-
ters which relate to its moral and political welfare” as well as “every law for the re-
straint of and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public peace, health, 
and morals” (internal citations omitted)).  Almost forty years later, the Supreme 
Court definitively held that land regulations were within a State’s police powers.  Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
 22 DAVID SLADE, R. KERRY KEHOE & JANE K. STAHL, COASTAL STATES ORG., PUTTING 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 4 (1990) [hereinafter SLADE ET AL.] (“It is of-
ten stated that the Public Trust Doctrine dates back to the sixth century Institutes  
of Justinian and the accompanying Digest, which collectively formed Roman civil  
law, . . . . [however these] were based, often verbatim, upon the second century Insti-
tutes and Journals of Gaius . . . .”). 
 23 See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 6, at 474 (advocating an expansive ap-
proach to the public trust doctrine “as a tool of general application for citizens seek-
ing to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management prob-
lems”). 
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public trust doctrine stands for the principle that land bordering 
navigable water belongs to the public and encumbers any future con-
veyance.24  A government therefore has the affirmative duty to protect 
public trust lands;25 if it fails to do so, a member of the public may 
have standing to sue the government for failing its fiduciary duty.26  
Ironically, many government regulations enacted as a direct response 
to public demand and increased environmental awareness came up 
 
 24 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).  Although the definition for the public 
trust doctrine has varied through the years, the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Mississippi, recognized Shively v. Bowlby, as the “seminal case in American public 
trust jurisprudence.”  Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988).  Shively de-
scribed the public trust doctrine as “title and dominion in lands flowed by the tide 
water . . . [held by] the King for the benefit of the nation . . . . [which] [u]pon the 
American Revolution . . . vested in the original States . . . .”  152 U.S. at 57; see also Ill. 
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (“It is settled law of this country 
that the ownership of . . . lands covered by tide waters . . . belong to the respective 
States within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of . . . 
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public . . . .”).  Matthews v. Bay 
Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), is generally thought of as the semi-
nal case reinstating the public trust doctrine into the lexicon of modern property 
law, and defines the public trust doctrine similarly to Shively, as “acknowledg[ing] 
that the ownership, dominion and sovereignty over land flowed by tidal waters, which 
extend to the mean high water mark, is vested in the State in trust for the people.”  
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358; see also Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51 
(N.J. 1972) (“That broad doctrine derives from the ancient principle of English law 
that land covered by tidal waters belonged to the sovereign, but for the common use 
of all the people.”); SLADE ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 (“The Public Trust Doctrine pro-
vides that public trust lands, waters and living resources in a State are held by the 
state in trust for the benefit of all of the people, and establishes the right of the pub-
lic to fully enjoy public trust lands, waters and living resources for a wide variety of 
recognized public uses.”); see generally Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 6 (explor-
ing the different definitions given to the public trust doctrine). 
 25 E.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (stating that 
the public trust is an “active . . . duty . . . [which] requires the state not only to pro-
mote navigation but also to protect and preserve those waters” for public benefit); 
CAROL M. ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON 
THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 110 (1994) (“[T]he ‘trust’ lan-
guage of public property doctrine . . . suggested that governments had duties to pre-
serve the property of what some cases called the ‘unorganized’ public.”). 
 26 Compare Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971) (holding that a pri-
vate citizen has standing), Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 
18 (Ill. 1970) (“If the ‘public trust’ doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all, 
the members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust, 
must have the right and standing to enforce it.”), with Scott v. Chicago Part Dist., 360 
N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ill. 1977) (noting that even though a citizen does not have standing 
to sue directly, dismissals of suits for lack of standing do not bar the State Attorney 
General from bringing suit); Belford v. City of New Haven, 364 A.2d 194, 198 (Conn. 
1975) (holding that “a private individual cannot maintain a bill to enjoin a breach of 
public trust, in the absence of statutory authority”) (quoting McCormick v. Chicago 
Yacht Club, 163 N.E. 418, 420 (Ill. 1928)). 
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against the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.27  The principle set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Lucas, that a prohibition on all land 
development triggered compensation,28 was and continues to be par-
ticularly problematic in regards to environmental regulations that 
prohibit or severely limit development on coastal lands.29 
Courts have attempted to get around Lucas in many creative 
ways, such as noting that a bare minimal economic benefit is left to 
the landowner,30 or fitting the regulation into the Lucas exceptions of 
“background principles of property law.”31  Some recent cases have 
even hinted at another means to bypass the inflexible Lucas stan-
dard—the survival of the “investment-backed expectations” Penn Cen-
tral factor,32 but have refused to directly address this possibility, hold-
 
 27 E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  But see, e.g., 
Just, 201 N.W.2d at 765, 767–68 (upholding a regulation “to aid in the fulfillment of 
the state’s role as trustee of its navigable waters” because the regulation did not take 
“a benefit not presently enjoyed by the public for its use” but merely maintained “the 
natural status quo of the environment”).  See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private 
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971) [hereinafter, Sax, Public Rights] 
(noting that the “interest in environmental quality . . . spawned various attempts at 
property regulation, many of which actually or potentially collide with the takings 
provision”); Houck, supra note 19, at 340 (emphasizing that the South Carolina regu-
lation at issue in Lucas was in response to serious erosion concerns and noting that 
the legislation was in compliance with the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act). 
 28 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 29 See generally Joseph L. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 
19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 715 (2002) [hereinafter Sax, Using Property Rights]; Houck, su-
pra note 19, at 340.  The critique of the focus on economic devaluation predates Lu-
cas.  Sax, Public Rights, supra note 27, at 172 (“[T]he current takings scheme intro-
duces an irrationality by requiring compensation when the conflict resolution system 
imposes extreme economic harm on discrete users but not when analogous harm is 
placed on diffuse users.”). 
 30 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
330 (2002) (emphasizing “that the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution 
in value were 95% instead of 100%”) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (remanding for consideration under the 
Penn Central balancing test rather than the Lucas categorical takings rule “because the 
value of upland portions [of the landowner’s property] is substantial”). 
 31 See, e.g., Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 
2002); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 125 (N.J. 
2005); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003), cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 982 (2003).  Nuisance law, the law of custom and the public trust doctrine 
are examples of “background principles.”  David L. Callies, Nuisance and Background 
Principles: The Lucas Exceptions, SJ052 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 473 (2004). 
 32 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119 n.5 (noting that “Lucas left much confusion . . . 
about whether another Penn Central factor, ‘investment-backed expectations,’ sur-
vived in the context of a total deprivation case”); see also Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 984 
(taking judicial notice of the fact that a developer purchased the land in question at 
a bargain price, even though broadly stating that “the multi-factor analysis estab-
lished in Penn Central” is inapplicable). 
RUIZ FINAL 5/30/2006  9:23:45 PM 
1316 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1309 
ing instead that the public trust doctrine saved the regulations at is-
sue from requiring compensation.33 
In McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council,34 the South Carolina 
Supreme Court found that a compensable taking had not taken place 
even where it was “uncontested that McQueen’s lots retain[ed] no 
value.”35  The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was based on 
the public trust doctrine.36  The facts of McQueen were similar to the 
facts of Lucas; in both cases, private property owners protested regu-
lations prohibiting all development on their property, where sur-
rounding lots had already been developed and therefore practically 
unaffected by the regulations.37  In another recent case, Esplanade 
Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle,38 the petitioners attempted to develop 
land “on and over tidelands located . . . near both a large city park 
and a large marina.”39  In Esplanade, the developers proposed to build 
residential housing “on platforms supported by pilings.”40  Although 
the courts in both cases ultimately found that the public trust doc-
trine allowed regulation without compensation,41 the visual cues of 
the land proposed for development were different—one dealt with 
lots surrounded by developed land, the other surrounded by land 
mostly undeveloped.42 
This Comment will argue that instead of stretching the legal 
boundaries of the exceptions to the Lucas categorical rule, especially 
in regards to the expanding use of the public trust doctrine, Lucas 
 
 33 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 120. 
 34 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003). 
 35 Id. at 119. 
 36 Id. at 120 (holding that “[t]he tidelands included on McQueen’s lots are pub-
lic trust property subject to control of the State”). 
 37 Compare id. at 118 (“McQueen purchased two non-contiguous lots located on 
manmade saltwater canals in the Cherry Grove section of North Myrtle Beach. . . . 
The lots surrounding McQueen’s are improved . . . .”), with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992) (describing the two lots at issue as within “ex-
tensive residential development . . . . located approximately 300 feet from the 
beach”). 
 38 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 39 Id. at 980. 
 40 Id. 
 41 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 150; Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 987. 
 42 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118; Esplande, 307 F.3d at 980.  Although not address-
ing the public trust doctrine, the case of Bowles v. United States also helps to highlight 
the importance of visual cues in property law.  31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994).  In Bowles, the 
court held the denial of a permit to fill land had accomplished a Lucas categorical 
taking, emphasizing that “[a]ll Mr. Bowles wanted to do was the same exact use as his 
surrounding neighbors; build a home in a residential subdivision.”  Id. at 46. 
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should be interpreted (or reformulated)43 to incorporate “invest-
ment-backed expectations” as informed by visual cues.  Because ex-
pectations reflect common notions of justice, this solution will allow 
enough flexibility for governments to further the public interest 
without upsetting the public’s perception of secure and stable prop-
erty rights.  Furthermore, this Comment will argue that the state of 
prior development on land or the changing topography of land is an 
acceptable means to determine when compensation is necessary be-
cause such cues directly inform the public’s reasonable expectations.  
Regard to visual cues will also serve to anchor and limit the potential 
for extreme vagueness in a rule based on expectations. 
Part I of this Comment will trace the history of takings jurispru-
dence, outlining the rationale behind the compensation requirement 
and the emergence of “investment-backed expectations.”  Part II will 
trace the history of the public trust doctrine and its uneasy fit within 
regulatory takings jurisprudence.  Part III will compare recent cases, 
including McQueen and Esplanade, that have skirted around Lucas by 
using the public trust doctrine.  Part III will also argue that ground-
ing the public trust doctrine with visual cues and general “investment-
backed expectations” will make the doctrine more compatible with 
accepted notions of justice, thus leading to a regulatory takings juris-
prudence that is more widely perceived as “fair.” 
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS: THE PERPLEXING SIMPLICITY 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN & THE NOT-SO-SIMPLE REGULATORY  
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
Implicit in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is the recogni-
tion that private property rights would sometimes need to give way to 
the public good.44  The problem with this deceptively simple rule is 
that no society is ever completely of one mind, and any change, even 
 
 43 Most commentators are adamant that Justice Scalia, in writing the Lucas opin-
ion, meant to completely eradicate any vestiges of the Penn Central factors when deal-
ing with economic wipeout cases.  See, e.g., Odabashian, supra note 7, at 664 (“Scalia 
determines . . . that in at least those cases in which all economically viable use of the 
land is destroyed, the Court need not look at investment-backed expectations at 
all.”); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 721 (“Justice Scalia advocated a fixed con-
ception [of background principles of property law] and disagreed with the evolu-
tionary conception of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer.”). 
 44 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  Even the Supreme Court de-
cision in Lucas acknowledged that landowners expected restrictions in the name of 
the State’s police powers.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) 
(“[T]he property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, 
from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exer-
cise of its police powers.”). 
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if in the interest of justice, no matter how incremental, will affront at 
least one member of any given society.45  Therefore, questions of 
when it is appropriate that public interests prevail over private rights 
have plagued the doctrine since its inception.46  The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on takings is an attempt to find a compromise between 
advancing the public good and vindicating private rights.47  Compen-
sation is a means to achieve this balance. 48  However, to say that com-
pensation is the answer would be to state a mere tautology.  The 
question remains the same: Under what circumstances does the con-
cept of fairness require compensation when a landowner’s property 
interests have been affected by government action?  As a starting 
point, the answer depends on the characterization of the government 
action.49  Has the government physically appropriated property or has 
it passed a law regulating property?  Physical appropriation of prop-
erty by the government falls under the relatively clear doctrine of 
eminent domain, while everything else falls under the unwieldy doc-
trine of regulatory takings.50 
 
 45 See Treanor, The Origins, supra note 2, at 705–06 (tracing the genesis of the 
Takings Clause, and noting a general rejection of the existence of “a readily dis-
cernible common good” and that the few states which included a just compensation 
clause before the adoption of the Bill of Rights did so on “the new insight that society 
was composed of groups whose interests irreconcilably diverged”). 
 46 See, e.g., Poirier, Virtue of Vagueness, supra note 14, at 97 (“In judicial opinion 
and academic assessment alike, it seems almost de rigueur to include at least one or 
two choice sentences of complaint [about the regulatory takings doctrine] . . . .”). 
 47 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) (referring to 
the Takings Jurisprudence as “essentially engaged in deciding when government may 
execute public programs while leaving associated costs disproportionately concen-
trated upon one or a few persons”); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 716. 
 48 Michelman, supra note 47, at 1180 (“[C]ompensation payments have some-
thing to do with maintaining at an acceptable level the assurance that benefits and 
burdens will be evenly distributed over the long run.”) (emphasis added). 
 49 Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992); see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and 
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62–63 (1964) [hereinafter Sax, Police Power] (classify-
ing government action as either enterprise or mediation and requiring compensa-
tion only if the government acts as an enterprise).  In a subsequent article, Sax 
shifted his focus away from the enterprise/mediation categorization to focus on 
property use, but the initial classification, though no longer central, remained in the 
background.  Sax, Public Rights, supra note 27, at 151. 
 50 Yee, 503 U.S. at 523 (“The first category of cases [physical appropriations] re-
quires courts to apply a clear rule; the second [involving regulatory takings] necessar-
ily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of gov-
ernment actions.”). 
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A. Eminent Domain—Compensation Expected and Granted 
Eminent domain is the inherent power of the federal, state, or 
local governments, as “sovereign” entities, to condemn private prop-
erty against the will of the individual for public use.51  This power of 
the government has generally been accepted as necessary, although 
the scope of the power is often the subject of dispute and varying ju-
dicial interpretations.52  While the definition of “public use”53 or the 
value of “just” compensation54 has been fiercely litigated, one aspect 
of eminent domain has remained consistent: A physical taking, no 
matter how de minimus, requires compensation.55  The classic example 
 
 51 E.g., Johnston v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 252 So. 2d 75, 76 (Ala. 1971); Haig v. 
Wateree Power Co., 112 S.E. 55, 57 (S.C. 1922). 
 52 E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (giving broad 
deference to local governments in determining whether eminent domain is justi-
fied); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 
1981) (same), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 
2004) (placing limitations on the government’s discretion based on state constitu-
tional grounds).  The controversy surrounding eminent domain proceedings is not a 
question of whether compensation should be paid—that compensation is due is 
never questioned when the government has physically appropriated private property.  
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (“In general (at least with 
regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter 
how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation.”); see also 
Michelman, supra note 47, at 1184 (“[C]ourts . . . never deny compensation for a 
physical takeover.”).  Instead, the controversy surrounding eminent domain proceed-
ings regards the definition of “public use.”  Initially, state courts had systematically 
ruled that local governments had broad deference in deciding the scope of the defi-
nition.  E.g., Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458, overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784; 
Kelo, 843 A.2d 500, 525–26 (Conn. 2004), aff’d by 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).  The 
Supreme Court approved this deferential standard in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff.  467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).  However, Midkiff did not calm the controversy, 
and more than twenty years later, the Supreme Court reinforced its decision in Mid-
kiff by finding in Kelo v. City of New London that an economic rejuvenation plan, where 
private property was condemned and transferred to private parties, was within the 
permissible scope of “public use.”  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.  However, that Supreme 
Court decision left room for the state supreme courts to limit government eminent 
domain powers under state constitutions.  See, e.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784. 
 53 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 54 It is generally accepted that “just compensation” equals fair market value, e.g., 
United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624, 644 (1948) (Reed, J., concurring); 
however, the debate surrounds whether there is a discernable market price, what fac-
tors into the market price, and if there is no discernable market price, what other 
factors can  determine the value of “just compensation.”  Id.  See generally Poirier, 
Regulatory Takings, supra note 1, at §§ 10A.18[1][b]–[g] (discussing what factors into 
the valuation of just compensation). 
 55 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
322 (2002) (“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in 
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former 
owner . . . .”) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)); Lu-
cas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
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of this decree at work is the ruling in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp.,56 which found that even the placement of a cable box 
and wires on property required compensation, notwithstanding the 
fact that the encroachment was barely noticeable and that fair market 
value was either not affected at all or only negligibly affected.57  
Commentators have repeatedly puzzled over why this rule is so ada-
mantly protected by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Con-
stitution.58  Perhaps it is because the Fifth Amendment’s language, 
“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation,”59 seems deceptively clear.60  Perhaps too, it is because his-
torically, the Fifth Amendment was meant to protect just that—
physical appropriations.61  Or maybe, the answer is simply that physi-
cal invasions are so tangible and visible that even though a particular 
appropriation may not result in monetary devaluation, allowing a 
physical invasion without demanding some kind of recompense 
would seriously undervalue closely held notions of security—both 
private and public expectations.62  Whatever rationale chosen, courts 
have consistently found that any time the government encroaches on 
property physically and permanently, it would be unjust to deny 
compensation.63 
 
434–35 (1982) (“In short, when the ‘character of the governmental action,’ is a per-
manent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to 
the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an im-
portant public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.” (inter-
nal citations omitted)). 
 56 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 57 Id. at 434–35. 
 58 Michelman, supra note 47, at 1185 (“[T]he magic of physical invasion is rooted 
in wordplay . . . . [that] begins to fail as soon as we press on to a modest level of lin-
gual sophistication.”).  For an excellent discussion of the weaknesses of the Taking 
Clause’s historical anchor, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of 
the Takings Clause and The Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).  In this arti-
cle, William Treanor notes that at the time the Fifth Amendment was adopted, 
“[e]ven with respect to physical seizures of property by the government, the compen-
sation requirement was not generally recognized . . . .”  Id. at 785. 
 59 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 60 Michelman, supra note 47, at 1185. 
 61 Treanor, The Origins, supra note 2, at 708 (“Madison intended the clause to 
have narrow legal consequences: It was to apply only to the federal government and 
only to physical takings.”). 
 62 ROSE, Seeing Property, supra note 11, at 269 (“Physical characteristics are often 
visible.  Perhaps this helps to explain why, for example, issues of governmental ‘tak-
ings’ are so notoriously sensitive when they concern what are called ‘physical inva-
sions’ of property . . . .”). 
 63 See Michelman, supra note 47, at 1184. 
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B. Regulatory Taking—The Propriety of Compensation Questioned 
Regulatory takings jurisprudence is fraught with inconsistencies 
and inadequacies.64  Unlike cases involving eminent domain, when it 
comes to regulatory takings law, the language of the Fifth Amend-
ment does not provide much guidance.65  In fact, it was not until 1922 
that the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,66 recog-
nized that anything other than physical appropriations fell within the 
ambit of the Takings Clause, and held “that while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be rec-
ognized as a taking.”67  This basic rule promulgated by Pennsylvania 
Coal is hazy; the boundaries of what is “too far” are the subject of con-
stant litigation.68  Even in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court identified the 
potential problems of extending takings claims to regulations prom-
ulgated according to the states’ valid police power.69  Specifically, the 
Court recognized that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law.”70  Furthermore, the 
Court acknowledged that legal property rights are not and have never 
been interpreted as absolute, stating, “[a]s long recognized, some values 
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police 
power.”71 
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court has repeatedly at-
tempted to formulate clear guidelines for determining when com-
 
 64 See Sax, Police Power, supra note 49, at 37. 
 65 Treanor, The Origins, supra note 2, at 711. 
 66 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 67 Id. at 415. 
 68 For example, there is a long list of leading cases developing the regulatory tak-
ings jurisprudence after regulatory takings was originally acknowledged in Pennsyl-
vania Coal.  In chronological order, those cases are: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (holding that zoning ordinances are not per se uncon-
stitutional); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(establishing a balancing test between the public interest, “distinct investment-
backed expectations,” and the extent of the “economic impact of the regulation”); 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (holding that a regulation 
working a total economic wipeout is a per se compensable taking); Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (holding that preexistence of regulations at the time 
property is acquired does not bar a takings claim); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341–42 (2002) (holding that temporary 
development moratoria are not per se unconstitutional). 
 69 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 70 Id. at 413.  The Supreme Court proved its commitment to this principle in 
holding that zoning regulations, although severely limiting property use in some 
cases, were not per se takings.  Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397. 
 71 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added). 
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pensation is required, not for physical appropriations, but for when a 
government legitimately uses its police power to regulate property in 
its jurisdiction.72  But the clarity seemingly established in any one Su-
preme Court case is inevitably criticized as illusory.73  The Court itself 
has acknowledged the difficulty of formulating bright line rules and 
even its reluctance to do so.74  It is not surprising, then, that the cur-
rent test for determining how far is really “too far,” is one that incor-
porates the original balancing test of Pennsylvania Coal, which identi-
fied the following factors: (1) “the extent of the diminution,” in 
“values incident to property;” (2) “[t]he extent of the public inter-
est,” and; (3) whether or not the particular regulation at issue con-
ferred an “average reciprocity of advantage” on the burdened prop-
erty owner.75  The Court fine-tuned this test in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.76  The Penn Central test added a 
crucial element to these factors—it introduced “investment-backed 
expectations” into the equation.77  The Penn Central balancing test, 
which courts currently apply, weighs the following factors: (1) “eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant;” (2) “the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations;” and (3) “the character of the governmental action,” 
including whether the regulation was “reasonably necessary to the ef-
fectuation of a substantial public purpose.”78  Naturally, a balancing 
 
 72 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 73 E.g., Sax, Police Power, supra note 49, at 37 (“In some specific instances [whether 
compensation is implicated] has become clear . . . . [However,] the predominant 
characteristic of this area of law is a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible 
results.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 39 (1994) (“Courts . . . cannot 
produce comprehensive solutions.  They can only interpret the rather precise lan-
guage of the fifth amendment . . . in very specific factual circumstances.”).  In an at-
tempt to formulate one such bright line rule, in 1992, the Supreme Court in Lucas, 
developed the economic wipeout test; however, in an opinion a decade later, the 
Court emphasized the narrow scope of the Lucas rule.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002) (“[W]e still resist the 
temptation to adopt per se rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings, pre-
ferring to examine ‘a number of factors’ rather than a simple ‘mathematically pre-
cise’ formula.”).  See also Sax, Police Power, supra note 49, at 37 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court] has developed the habit of introducing its uniformly unsatisfactory opinions 
in this area with the understatement that ‘no rigid rules’ or ‘set formula’ are avail-
able . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 75 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413–15. 
 76 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 393. 
 77 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 78 Id. at 124–27. 
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test does not result in any bright line rules; instead the outcome of 
each claim is fact specific.79 
The balancing test reformulated in Penn Central, however, did 
not eliminate the public’s desire or demand for bright line rules.  In 
1992, the Supreme Court carved out one arguably clear rule for when 
a “regulation goes too far.”80  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil,81 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, announced the following 
categorical rule: “[W]hen the owner of real property has been called 
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the 
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has 
suffered a taking,”82 without regard to “the public interest ad-
vanced.”83  This categorical rule equates some limited types of regula-
tions to a physical invasion.84 
While, at first blush, this rule appears innovative, the essence of 
the rule existed in the early Penn Central analysis.85  The fact that a 
regulation works a complete economic wipeout on a landowner trig-
gers the first and second Penn Central factors—economic impact and 
investment backed expectations.86  Although Lucas explicitly directs 
that the third prong—the public interest—is not to be weighed 
against a landowner’s interest, the impact of Lucas on the Penn Central 
test is dubious.87  The circumstances under which the Lucas rule 
would apply, complete economic wipeout and annihilation of an 
owner’s investment-backed expectations, heavily favor the land-
owner’s interests.  Therefore, even if the Penn Central test applied, the 
public interest would have to be great indeed in order to outweigh 
 
 79 See Poirier, Regulatory Takings, supra note 1, at §§ 10A.04, 10A-17 (“[The] fact 
specific inquiry mandated by Penn Central and its progeny . . . . [i]n most cases . . . is 
unavoidable.”).  The principle of “ad-hoc, factual inquiries” was criticized in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992), yet championed in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 
(2002). 
 80 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 81 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 82 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 83 Id. at 1015–16. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127–28 (1978) (rea-
soning that where a statute has “nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of 
[property] rights . . . the statute was invalid as effecting a ‘taking’ without just com-
pensation”).  The Penn Central Court even cites a 1908 case that expounded the same 
rule—specifically, that if a “restriction makes property wholly useless ‘the rights of 
property . . . prevail over the other public interest’ and compensation is required.”  
Id. at 128 (quoting Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908)). 
 86 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 87 Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 46 (1994). 
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the overwhelming detriment to the landowner and defeat the conclu-
sion that a taking had occurred.  Furthermore, although not obvious, 
the exception carved out in Lucas inherently considers the public in-
terest, at least to a certain extent.88  This exception is set forth in the 
rule that where the regulation merely reflects “background principles 
of the State’s law of property and nuisance,” the Takings Clause does 
not require compensation, no matter the extent of economic depri-
vation.89  Considering that “background principles” of property law 
consist, for the most part, of regulations enacted pursuant to a State’s 
police power,90 which in turn is the power to act in the public inter-
est,91 the Lucas exception may in fact reintroduce the very factor it 
purports to do away with.  The fact that courts are increasingly ac-
knowledging the public trust doctrine as a background principle of 
property law reinforces the conclusion that Lucas is not such a bright 
line rule after all. 
Taking aside whether Lucas truly eradicated the “public interest” 
Penn Central factor, another question remained: Lucas was unclear as 
to whether, in order to claim compensation, an affected property 
owner had to have distinct “investment-backed expectations.”92  Re-
cent cases suggest an affirmative answer.93  The unanswered questions 
of Lucas had the ironic effect of making the doctrine closer to the 
 
 88 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (“The ‘total taking’ inquiry we require today will ordi-
narily entail . . . analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands 
and resources . . . .”). 
 89 Id. at 1029. 
 90 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 91 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 92 McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 n.5 (S.C. 2003) (“Lucas 
left much confusion . . . about whether another Penn Central factor, ‘investment-
backed expectations,’ survived in the context of a total deprivation case.”).  This con-
fusion can be traced back to the opinions in Lucas.  For example, Justice Scalia, writ-
ing the opinion in Lucas highlighted the fact that Lucas had purchased the property 
with the intention to develop it.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.  Furthermore, Justice Ken-
nedy in his concurrence noted that the initial determination of whether a regulation 
at issue deprived the property of all value depends upon the landowner’s reasonable 
expectations.  Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The finding of no value must 
be considered under the Takings Clause by reference to the owner’s reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectations.”); see also Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 
F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial notice of the fact that a developer pur-
chased the land in question at a bargain price, even though broadly stating that “the 
multi-factor analysis established in Penn Central” is inapplicable). 
 93 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119 n.5; Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 984; Westside Quick 
Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270, 275 (S.C. 2000).  But see Palm Beach Isles As-
socs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a regulatory 
taking, properly determined to be ‘categorical,’ is found to have occurred, the prop-
erty owner is entitled to a recovery without regard to consideration of investment-
backed expectations.”). 
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Penn Central test in its practical application.94  Notwithstanding these 
unanswered questions, regulatory takings jurisprudence before Lucas 
seemed to at least have had the appearance of manageability, if not 
quite predictability: If a case involved total taking, compensation 
would be required in all but narrow exceptions; if a partial taking oc-
curred, the Penn Central test would continue to be applied.95 
This token clarity was upset yet again in a 2001 Supreme Court 
case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.96  The Palazzolo case dealt with a partial 
taking, and was thus outside of the realm of Lucas,97 yet its implica-
tions regarding the perseverance of “investment-backed expectations” 
are worth noting.  The Court ruled that even though the petitioner, 
Anthony Palazzolo, acquired title to the land after a regulation had 
been in place, his takings claim was not automatically barred.98  This 
rule, at first blush, seems contrary to the concept of “investment-
backed expectations,” as it was commonly thought that prior notice 
of property restrictions made certain expectations unreasonable.99  
Justice Kennedy, however, justified the need for such a rule, because 
to hold otherwise would allow “[a] State . . . to put an expiration date 
on the Takings Clause.”100 
 
 94 See, for example, the United States Court of Federal Claims’ regulatory taking 
analysis in Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994), which although held that the 
regulation had effectuated a total taking, nevertheless proceeded to analyze the facts 
under both the Lucas and Penn Central tests, concluding that “the facts of this case 
require just compensation under either analysis.”  Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 46. 
 95 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119. 
 96 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 97 Id. at 631–632. 
 98 Id. at 628. 
 99 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 47, at 1213 (arguing that compensation is only 
necessary to maintain societal morale, which will in turn lead to an efficient society).  
In his seminal article, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Frank I. Michelman explained that 
a society would suffer through demoralization when it saw one of its members as a 
targeted “victim[] of unprincipled exploitation,” resulting in the fear that at any 
moment any one of its members could become such a target by legislative design.  Id. 
at 1230.  Further, Michelman noted that all tests employed by courts in regulatory 
takings claims attempted to determine “whether or not the measure in question can 
easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, 
sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.”  Id. at 1233.  Michelman ration-
alized the stress on a clear manifestation of an owner’s expectations by stating that 
the “land speculator who is unable to show that he has yet formed any specific plans 
for his vacant land still has a package of possibilities with its value, though lessened, 
still unspecified—which is what he had before.”  Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).  This 
leads to the conclusion that if a regulation restricted property use before the owner 
took title to undeveloped property, then he could not have had any expectations as 
to that use. 
 100 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. 
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Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, attempted to reconcile 
the expectations factor with the seemingly inapposite holding of Pa-
lazzolo.101  By stating that “the regulatory regime in place at the time 
the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reason-
ableness of those expectations,” Justice O’Connor noted that prior 
notice was not irrelevant to the analysis.102  To imply otherwise would 
have been contrary to public perceptions of justice: “[I]f existing 
regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some property 
owners may reap windfalls and an important indicia of fairness is 
lost.”103  Although Justice O’Connor’s analysis dealt with a partial tak-
ing, this statement, regarding the importance of the regulatory 
scheme in place at the time the owner takes title, can be applied with 
equal force to a total takings case, where a property owner who 
bought land subject to certain regulations probably did so at a bar-
gain price.104  In such a case, justice would not mandate that the gov-
ernment pay for a landowner’s inability to develop, and in fact, would 
even militate against it.105 
 The Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis on the factual nature 
of the regulatory takings inquiry further weighs in favor of extending 
the expectations factor to total takings cases.106  Although bright line 
rules may be desirable, such rules should only be employed in a small 
number of cases, where the taking seems so obvious that no contro-
versy really exists—in other words, where the justice in granting com-
pensation is generally accepted.  Such is the nature of the bright line 
 
 101 Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 727 
(noting that Justice O’Connor’s approach leaves open the possibility “that a regula-
tion effecting a taking from present holders might someday be assimilated into the 
background principals of property law so that some or all post-enactment acquirers 
would not succeed with takings claims”). 
 102 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 103 Id. at 635.  But see id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The ‘investment-backed 
expectations’ that the law will take into account do not include the assumed validity 
of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be unconsti-
tutional.”).  Justice Scalia would advocate that no windfall occurs because although 
prior regulations should not play a role in determining whether a “taking” has oc-
curred, it does play a vital role in determining damages.  See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles 
Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Once a taking has 
been found, the use restrictions on the property are one of the factors that are taken 
into account in determining damages due the owner.”). 
 104 See, e.g., Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 
2002) (noting that the developer purchased the coastal land in 1991 for “only 
$40,000”); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“At the time 
he bought the subject parcel, Appellant acknowledged both the necessity and the 
difficulty of obtaining regulatory approval.”). 
 105 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 106 See supra note 79. 
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rule regarding physical invasions.107  The categorical rule in Lucas also 
came about in a case where the reasonable expectations of the land-
owner were not questioned.  The regulation at issue was enacted after 
Lucas had purchased the property specifically for residential devel-
opment.108  Furthermore, the lots surrounding Lucas’s particular lots 
had been developed and were not affected by the regulation at is-
sue—thus visually, the public could literally see that Lucas was shoul-
dering a disproportionate part of the common burden—the empty 
lot a reminder of the right “taken.”109  Even though the reasonable 
expectations factor was not explicit in the Lucas test (and was in fact 
denied), the rule that resulted in compensation for Lucas complied 
with both public and private expectations.  Further, Lucas’s private 
expectation included not only his own personal expectations, but also 
included the individual expectations of other members of the public 
who empathized with Lucas.110 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE—A DOCTRINE OF EXPECTATIONS? 
The public trust doctrine has its origins in the ancient Roman 
ideal of jus publicum—the notion of the “public right.”111  This princi-
ple was carried over into English law, where submerged and tidal 
lands were owned by the King and open to the public.112  With the in-
dependence of the United States, the ownership of public trust lands 
vested in the public, to be administered by the elected State govern-
ments.113  Although the doctrine was recognized early in U.S. his-
 
 107 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 108 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).  There is no indica-
tion that the property was bought at a bargain price, as was noted in other cases, but 
rather that Lucas paid a price reflective of the suitability for residential development.  
Id. at 1039 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 109 Id.  Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, highlighted the potential importance 
of the developed and non-regulated state of neighboring property lots, stating that 
where a regulation unevenly distributed the burden on remaining undeveloped land, 
the owner’s reasonable expectations may be thwarted.  Id. at 1035–36 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he means, as well as the ends, of regulation must accord with the 
owner’s reasonable expectations.  Here, the State did not act until after the property 
had been zoned for individual lot development and most other parcels had been im-
proved, throwing the whole burden of the regulation on the remaining lots. ”). 
 110 See Michelman, supra note 47, at 1230; see also supra note 99 and accompanying 
text (discussing demoralization costs in takings jurisprudence). 
 111 See SLADE ET AL., supra note 22, at 6. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.  Further, some states include versions of the public trust doctrine in their 
constitutions.  Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“The [public trust] doctrine is ‘partially encapsulated in the language of 
[Washington’s] constitution which reserves state ownership in “the beds and shores 
of all navigable waters in the state.”’” (internal citations omitted)); Pub. Access 
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tory,114 it had not been widely used,115 nor so expansively claimed,116 so 
that the public trust doctrine as it reemerged in the latter half of the 
twentieth century caught much of the general public by surprise.117  
This aspect of surprise can be attributed, in part, to the vagueness of 
the public trust’s scope,118 especially when compared to fixed notions 
 
Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. County Planning Comm’n., 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995) (cit-
ing to HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7, which protects “all rights, customarily and tradition-
ally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes”).  Other states refer to 
“law of custom” as opposed to the public trust doctrine.  E.g., Thornton v. Hay, 462 
P.2d 671, 676 (Or. 1969).  But the “law of custom” is strikingly similar to the public 
trust doctrine, as the rationale behind the law of custom is that rights and access to 
certain natural resources have always been enjoyed by the public, thus providing no-
tice to landowners that they are taking the land subject to that custom, and therefore 
the right to exclude the public is not part of private property rights.  Id. at 678.  The 
difference between custom and public trust may lie in the theory that custom may be 
a more expansive doctrine.  See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 903 P.2d at 1272.  The 
public trust doctrine is usually only used in reference to lands bordering bodies of 
water.  See, e.g., McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 118 (S.C. 2003).  
For example, in Hawaii, custom is used not only to allow access to water, but also to 
allow native Hawaiians access to land anywhere in the state to practice any traditional 
Hawaiian right.  Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 903 P.2d at 1272.  But see Hawaii v. Hanapi, 
970 P.2d 485, 495 n.10 (Haw. 1998) (restricting rights to land that has not been fully 
developed and especially restricting rights over residential property). 
 114 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 435 (1892). 
 115 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633 (1986) (arguing 
that the public trust doctrine is “resist[ing] a legal system that is otherwise being 
abandoned”). 
 116 For a brief review of the public trust doctrine’s evolution from public necessity 
to public leisure, see Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n. v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 
19, 27–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).  New Jersey 
is a state that has broadly defined the public trust doctrine.  Id.  The appellate deci-
sion in Raleigh details how the public trust as it was defined by Roman law allowed 
public access “to dry . . .  [fish] nets there, and haul them from the sea,” and how an 
early English case viewed the necessity of beach access as “essential to [the public’s] 
welfare.”  Id. at 27–28 (quoting the Justinian Institutes and Blundell v. Catterral, 
(1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1199 (K.B.)).  The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed 
the appellate decision in Raleigh, which extended the public trust not only for public 
recreational uses of the wet sand area, but also to the entire beach itself.  Raleigh, 879 
A.2d at 124–25. 
 117 See SLADE ET AL., supra note 22, at 9 (noting how the requirement that private 
property owners of public trust land pay property taxes on the land, combined with 
the typical silence of deeds as to the public trust or to the exact water boundary, 
“lend[s] a certain credence to the private owner’s perception that he or she has sole 
possession and control of the property, exclusive of the public”). 
 118 C.f. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Oregon’s vacillations 
on the scope of the doctrine of custom make it difficult to say how much of the coast 
is covered.”); Thornton, 462 P.2d at 679 (Denecke, J., specially concurring) (“The law 
regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of the public must 
change as the public need changes.” (internal citations omitted)).  See also ROSE, su-
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of private property rights and, specifically, the right to exclude oth-
ers.119  Further, its use to defeat takings claims, even after the suppos-
edly bright line rule declared in Lucas, and its uneasy fit within regu-
latory takings jurisprudence,120 adds to the dimension of 
unexpectedness. 
The infusion of surprise in contemporary invocations of the pub-
lic trust doctrine is ironic and illustrates the need to turn to visual 
cues for a more practical and obvious indicator to decide inverse 
condemnation claims.  Public trust cases almost without exception 
highlight the long history of the doctrine.121  Indeed, courts after Lu-
cas have had to cite to this long history in order to fit the public trust 
within its “background principal of property law” exception.122  The 
rationale being that such history is tantamount to prior notice that 
certain lands are impressed with the public trust even where they may 
have been conveyed in fee simple to private entities.123  Thus, an 
owner cannot claim surprise when the right of exclusion is missing 
from his or her “bundle of rights.”124  Yet surprise is at the basis of all 
regulatory takings claims—surprise (and indignation) that a society 
would restrict a fundamental right. 
This underlying paradox is a theme running through the many 
legal commentaries that debate whether the public trust doctrine is 
 
pra note 25, at 111 (“[T]he modern public trust doctrine, in spite of its popularity, is 
notoriously vague as to its own subject matter . . . .”). 
 119 See, e.g., Callies, supra note 31, at 488 (emphasizing the importance of limiting 
the doctrine of custom because of “the potentially severe impact . . . on property 
rights in general, and the right to exclude others in particular”). 
 120 For example, unlike typical takings claims, where the plaintiff is the private 
property owner, public trust cases are instituted by individuals or organizations on 
behalf of the public.  See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n., 471 A.2d 
355, 358 (N.J. 1984); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 
A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972).  Therefore, a particular regulation is not scrutinized, but 
rather the focus of these cases shifted to the actions of landowners, turning a takings 
claim on its head.  See, e.g., Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358; Borough of Neptune City, 294 
A.2d at 55. 
 121 E.g., Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“It is beyond cavil that ‘a public trust doctrine has always existed in Washington.’”); 
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003) (citing to a South 
Carolina Supreme Court decision from 1884); Matthews, 471 A.2d at 360 (citing to 
ancient Roman law); Raleigh, 851 A.2d at 27 (citing to ancient Roman law). 
 122 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 120 (holding that Lucas does not require a State to 
compensate a landowner “for the denial of permits to do what he cannot otherwise 
do”); c.f. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 1207 (1994)) (holding that the law of custom is but a “background principle 
of property” and thus survives a Lucas scrutiny). 
 123 Stevens, 854 P.2d at 457. 
 124 Id. 
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properly identified as a background principle of property law.125  For 
Justice Scalia, the author of the Lucas opinion, this paradox is unac-
ceptable.126  The exception to Lucas was not meant to be expansively 
read or used as a sword to defeat public expectations.127  Justice 
Scalia’s view is made clear in his dissent from the denial of certiorari 
of Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.128  In Stevens, plaintiffs who owned 
oceanfront lots claimed an unconstitutional taking when they were 
denied applications to build a seawall that was necessary for the 
land’s development.129  At issue was whether the State law of custom, 
as announced in its 1969 case, Thornton v. Hay,130 was viable in light of 
Lucas.131  In holding that it was, the Oregon State Supreme Court rea-
soned that Oregon’s law of custom was not a newly legislated law, but 
rather a background principle of state property law.132  Therefore, 
even if the law of custom resulted in an economic wipeout, the Ore-
gon State Supreme Court determined that no compensation was due 
because the landowners “never had the property interests that they 
claim were taken by defendant’s decision and regulations.”133 
In his dissent from denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia sharply 
criticized that holding as “invoking nonexistent rules of state substan-
tive law.”134  He emphasized that the “opinion in Lucas . . . would be a 
nullity if anything that a State court chooses to denominate ‘back-
ground law’—regardless of whether it is really such—could eliminate 
property rights.”135  Despite Justice Scalia’s attempt to clarify the Lucas 
opinion, state courts continue to use the public trust doctrine to de-
feat takings claims.136 
 
 125 See generally Callies, supra note 31; Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth Amendment 
Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,” 29 ENVTL. L. 939 (1999). 
 126 See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 127 Id.   
 128 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994). 
 129 Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 130 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1967). 
 131 Stevens, 854 P.2d at 453. 
 132 Id. at 456. 
 133 Id. at 457. 
 134 Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1211 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2002) (stat-
ing that “Lucas . . . effectively recognized the public trust doctrine” by referring to 
State background principles of property law); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis 
Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 19, 32–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d 879 A.2d 
112 (N.J. 2005); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003). 
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III. VISUAL CUES, EXPECTATIONS & THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: 
THE MEANS TO INSPIRE SECURITY 
As previously stated in this Comment, the vagueness of the pub-
lic trust doctrine is a potential source of public unease.137  To satisfy 
conceptions of justice, the doctrine needs to be perceived as more 
concrete.  Tying the public trust doctrine with visual cues can help to 
inspire a more secure notion of absolute property rights.  Two recent 
cases, McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Esplanade Proper-
ties, LLC v. City of Seattle, although relying on the public trust doctrine 
to defeat a taking, exemplify the importance of visual cues. 
Relying on vision as a form of knowledge has been historically 
critiqued because of the notion that vision is inflexible and unable to 
capture the nuances of life necessary to form a complete understand-
ing of the world.138  However, it is precisely this perceived inflexibility 
that provides reassurance.  Even though people are constantly 
warned that things are not always as they appear, because of the sheer 
emphasis in modern society on the visual,139 a picture is always, and 
will continue to be, worth a thousand words.  Vision, in reality is con-
trary to the ideal notion of vision which provides so much security; it 
is perhaps the most vulnerable of the senses because our surround-
ings are in constant flux.  The vulnerability lies in the fact that be-
cause of the constant changes taking place, we do not consciously take 
notice of the vast majority of those changes.140  A frightening—but 
 
 137 See supra notes 8, 118–20 and accompanying text. 
 138 ROSE, Seeing Property, supra note 11, at 268.  Rose notes with disapproval that 
“[a]ccording to some, vision is not the appropriate sense to support persuasive inter-
actions at all. . . . [S]ome scholars have mounted a rather startling attack on vision as 
. . . [a] static model for knowledge . . . .”  Id. 
 139 For example, the renowned German social critic and philosopher, Theodor 
Adorno, described the origins of modern culture’s reliance on vision to the subordi-
nation of all other senses as “the adaptation [of the public] to . . . the age of ad-
vanced industry, which was made by the eye when it accustomed itself to perceiving 
reality as a reality of objects . . . .”  THEODOR ADORNO, IN SEARCH OF WAGNER 99 (Rod-
ney Livingston, trans. 1984) (1952). 
 140 Nietzsche described this phenomenon as a “crisis of assimilation” where 
“[s]ensibility [became] immensely more irritable” due to the physical and rapid 
changes created by the Industrial Revolution.  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO 
POWER 47 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale, trans., Random House 1967) 
(1901).  Nietzsche’s eloquent description of this phenomenon evokes his despera-
tion in the failings of vision: 
The tempo of this influx [of images] prestissimo; the impressions erase 
each other; one instinctively resists taking in anything, taking anything 
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true—realization is that most people exist in a state of oblivion.141  
While it has never been the ideal to be considered oblivious, that lack 
of perception can ironically help property law become more flexible.  
Changes are noted, even if subconsciously, and when a particular 
change is pointed out, or noted, whether it be by personal epiphany 
or through public outcry, that change is no longer shocking because 
it has already been consumed. 
Visual cues are even more appropriate to the stabilization of 
regulatory takings jurisprudence precisely because so many areas of 
property law are already dependant on visual cues.142  This is an ele-
mental concept learned at an early age by children—at least those 
who have watched Marvin the Martian race to claim various planets 
with colorful flags.143  Whether it is obtaining rights over wild animals 
or obtaining rights to land—the surest way to claim possession is 
through leaving a visual mark.  In McQueen, nature left its visible mark 
by flooding previously dry land—that is how the South Carolina Su-
preme Court was able to proclaim that it was nature and not the state 
that took the land.  And just like a person can take another’s land 
through adverse possession,144 the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
with the help of the public trust doctrine, created an analogous doc-
trine for nature. 
 
from this.  A kind of adaptation to the flood of impressions takes place: 
men unlearn spontaneous action, they merely react to stimuli from the 
outside. 
Id. 
 141 Id.  See also JONATHAN CRARY, Modernity and the Problem of the Observer, in 
TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER: ON VISION AND MODERNITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
24 (1990)  Although modernity “demolish[ed] the field of classical vision, [it] gener-
ated techniques for imposing visual attentiveness, rationalizing sensation, and man-
aging perception . . . . [Such] disciplinary techniques . . . never allowed a real world 
to acquire solidity or permanence.”  Id. 
 142 ROSE, Seeing Property, supra note 11, at 269 (“[G]enerally visibility runs through 
property law as perhaps no other legal area.”). 
 143 See JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 7 (Penguin Books 1977) (1972) (“Seeing 
comes before words.  The child looks and recognizes before it can speak.”). 
 144 Adverse possession is the property law doctrine by which a trespasser can be 
vested with legal claim of title to another’s land by the passage of time, as long as the 
possession is continuous, open and notorious, actual, and hostile.  Marengo Cave Co. 
v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 1937).  For a more detailed account of adverse posses-
sion, see generally Henry W. Ballantine, Title By Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 
135 (1918). 
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A.  The Public Trust Doctrine v. Visual Cues: What Will the  
Neighbors Say? 
Lucas did not discuss the public trust doctrine; it was not neces-
sary before Lucas’s pronouncement of its infamous categorical rule.  
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court in McQueen v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, one of the more recent state supreme court 
cases to address public expectations and coastal regulations, relied on 
the public trust doctrine to save a similar regulation from violating 
the Fifth Amendment.145  This begs the question of whether the pub-
lic trust doctrine, had it been raised, could have saved the regulation 
at issue in Lucas.  While some visual factors in Lucas and McQueen 
overlap, other facts of the two cases created divergent visual effects, 
which in turn could have allowed for the same opposite outcomes, 
even had Lucas included the public trust doctrine in its analysis.  Al-
though in both cases, the land at issue bordered the beach, the 
neighboring properties had been fully developed, and a coastal man-
agement regulation had rendered the property valueless, analyzing 
the differences in the visual cues in the two cases can lead to a better 
understanding of their polar holdings.146 
In Lucas, the lots regulated “were located approximately 300 feet 
from the beach.”147  In McQueen, the lots at issue “had reverted to tide-
lands or critical area saltwater wetlands,” with both of Mr. McQueen’s 
lots subject to tidal flow.148  Further, the time between purchase and 
development was significantly greater in McQueen than in Lucas.149  
Lucas purchased his lots within an ongoing development project and 
commissioned architectural drawings for the lots soon after their 
purchase; both these actions were tangible evidence of Lucas’s expec-
tations to “do like his neighbors” and develop his land.150  When the 
regulation prohibiting development passed, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court characterized Lucas as having “promptly filed [a tak-
ings] suit.”151  The landowners in McQueen, on the other hand, bought 
their lots in the early 1960s and did not attempt to develop until 
 
 145 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003). 
 146 The public trust doctrine was not raised in Lucas; however, this Comment ar-
gues that reliance on visual cues would eliminate the need to rely on the public trust 
doctrine. 
 147 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992). 
 148 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118. 
 149 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–08; McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118. 
 150 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008 
 151 Id. at 1009. 
RUIZ FINAL 5/30/2006  9:23:45 PM 
1334 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1309 
1991, when McQueen filed a series of applications requesting permis-
sion to build bulkheads and backfill the lots.152 
The visual stories created in Lucas and McQueen, both by the 
treatment of the landowners themselves and nature, were vastly dif-
ferent.  In regards to Lucas’s land, the public saw an ongoing con-
struction sight, relatively far from the beach, on dry land, amidst a 
fully developed residential neighborhood.  The expectations not only 
of Lucas, but also of the public in regards to that land were thwarted 
when a regulation barred all construction.  What would have re-
mained had the regulation not been struck down would have been a 
gaping hole of dry land amidst the beachfront property.  In the case 
of McQueen’s lots, the public not only became accustomed to the lots 
remaining undeveloped, but also nature had taken its course and re-
claimed the land.153  While there is a public expectation that land will 
be developed, there is no such correlating expectation that the ocean 
will be developed.  It is in fact the opposite expectation—that bodies 
of water will be free from private domain—that is at the core of the 
public trust doctrine and the related doctrine of custom.  Thus, while 
the holding in McQueen was solely based on the public trust doctrine, 
it can also be seen as the culmination of public expectations, aided in 
part by objective visual cues.  It is also significant to note that while 
the lots in Lucas had been purchased for close to one million dol-
lars,154 the two lots in McQueen had been purchased in the 1960s for 
less than five thousand dollars, which, even taking into consideration 
inflation, would still have been a minimal sum.155 
A brief description of Esplanade, another recent case invoking 
the public trust doctrine, also paints a compelling portrait of how 
public expectations can be reflected in the denial of compensation 
claims.  The Ninth Circuit described the lots at issue in Esplanade as 
“first class tideland . . . submerged completely for roughly half of the 
day, during which time it resembles a large sand bar.”156  The land-
owner in Esplanade proposed to construct platforms, supported by pil-
ings, on top of which he would build nine luxury residences.157  The 
land at issue in Esplanade, like in McQueen, was bought at a bargain 
 
 152 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118. 
 153 Id. at 120.  In fact, the South Carolina Supreme Court made a point of stating 
that “[a]ny taking McQueen suffered [was] not a taking effected by State regulation 
but by the forces of nature and McQueen’s own lack of vigilance in protecting his 
property.”  Id. 
 154 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006. 
 155 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118. 
 156 Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 157 Id. 
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price—forty thousand dollars, with a development plan that was likely 
to produce a substantial return.158  Unlike McQueen, in Esplanade, 
there was not even the contrary visual effect of neighboring resi-
dences to weigh in favor of the plaintiff—only undeveloped land, sur-
rounded by a marina and a city park.159 
Thus, even though neither the South Carolina Supreme Court 
in McQueen, nor the Ninth Circuit reached the issue of whether the 
Penn Central reasonable investment-backed expectations factor sur-
vived Lucas,160 both cases exemplified the need for such an inquiry.  
In essence, McQueen is the Lucas case, but with all the presumptions 
of the owner’s reasonable expectations stripped away.  The Esplanade 
case presented an even more dramatic case in which the invocation 
of the public trust doctrine vindicated public expectations shaped by 
the visual aspect of the land. 
B. Public & Private Expectations: What Are My Neighbors Doing? 
Neighbors’ actions are social indicators of what is acceptable and 
what is intolerable.161  In the realm of takings law, it is therefore not 
surprising that neighbors’ visible treatment of their properties have 
affected the outcome of takings claims.162  This was a theme running 
through Lucas itself, where in setting up the factual context of the 
case, Justice Scalia noted that Mr. Lucas’s “intention with respect to 
the lots was to do what the owners of the immediately adjacent par-
cels had already done . . . .”163  Another regulatory takings case shortly 
 
 158 Id. at 987. 
 159 Id. at 980. 
 160 McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119. 
 161 See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 43 n.8 (1994) (reprinting, in 
part, a letter sent to the plaintiff by the Architectural Commission in regards to the 
plaintiff’s development proposal, which explained that filling and sodding would be 
necessary and giving as its reasoning their desire to prevent “a precedent which 
would allow other potential homeowners to cut corners”).  Society’s concern with 
placing restrictions on an individual’s property is embodied in zoning laws, and in 
the popularity and growth of common interest communities.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000) (defining “common interest commu-
nity” as a development or neighborhood where individual lots are burdened with re-
ciprocal servitudes).  For an article discussing common interest communities’ mis-
placed preoccupation with neighbors’ actions, see Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a 
Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. 
REV. 553, 559 (2002). 
 162 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992). 
 163 Id. 
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following Lucas, Bowles v. United States, is even more explicit in ac-
knowledging the role of visual cues.164 
In Bowles, the plaintiff bought an undeveloped lot within a resi-
dential subdivision upwards of the waterline.165  In order to begin de-
velopment, the lot needed to be filled to accommodate a septic sys-
tem.166  Although the plaintiff was aware of the need to receive 
approval from local regulatory agencies to proceed in developing his 
lot,167 he had not been aware that a fill permit from the Army Corps 
of Engineers was also necessary.168  At trial, it was established that he 
was the only lot owner who had ever been required to apply for such 
a permit.169  The Corps denied Mr. Bowles’ application, basing its de-
cision on its jurisdiction to protect wetlands.170  In appealing the 
Corps’ decision, Mr. Bowles’ argument was essentially, “all my 
neighbors are doing it, so why can’t I?”171 
The reasonableness of Mr. Bowles’ expectations, as informed by 
the visual cues created by the neighboring property, permeated the 
Court of Federal Claims’ opinion,172 which ultimately held in favor of 
Mr. Bowles based on both a Penn Central and a Lucas takings analy-
sis.173  Finding that the taking was categorical, the court noted that the 
trial court’s focus on “reasonable investment-backed expectations . . . 
may have been unnecessary.”174  Nevertheless, the court proceeded to 
analyze the case under both, finding that under either doctrine, 
compensation was due.175  In discussing the Lucas “background prin-
 
 164 Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 46 (“All Mr. Bowles wanted to do was the same exact use 
as his surrounding neighbors; build a home in a residential subdivision.”). 
 165 Id. at 40.  Whether the lot was actually part of the residential subdivision was a 
disputed fact at the trial court level; however, the court held that, “a reasonable in-
vestor would have considered it part of the subdivision.”  Id. at 42. 
 166 Id. at 40. 
 167 Id. at 42. 
 168 Id. at 43. 
 169 Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 43. 
 170 Id. at 40. 
 171 Id.  This is a paraphrase of the courts language, which states:  “Plaintiff argued 
that all his neighbors in the subdivision were allowed to place fill on their property 
for the purpose of installing septic systems.”  Id. 
 172 See id. at 41, 42, 43 n.9, 46, 51 (alluding to or explicitly addressing Bowles’ rea-
sonable expectations: “Bowles took what he believed to be an opportunity;” “a rea-
sonable investor would have considered [the lot to be within the subdivision];” “[the 
evidence] tends to support . . . Bowles [sic] contention that a reasonable purchaser 
would have assumed;; “[a]ll Mr. Bowles wanted to do was the same exact use as his 
surrounding neighbors;” “the court visited the property and saw nothing that could 
reasonably constitute a ‘red flag’”). 
 173 Id. at 46. 
 174 Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175 Id. 
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ciple of property law” exception, the court summarily stated that it 
was inapplicable, reasoning that “[a]ll Mr. Bowles wanted to do was 
the same exact use as his surrounding neighbors; build a home in a 
residential subdivision”176—language remarkably similar to that used 
in Lucas.  The influence of the surrounding development was clear: 
[T]he court visited the property and saw nothing that could rea-
sonably constitute a “red flag” that would justify imputing Bowles 
with “notice” of the Corps jurisdiction over Lot 29.  If anything, 
the opposite was apparent.  There are several constructed homes 
on the north side of China Clipper Drive on lots virtually identical 
to Lot 29. . . . [E]ven after the time of Bowles’ permit denial other 
lots within the subdivision were filled in the exact manner Bowles 
wanted to fill his.177 
At first blush, the potency of this analysis is diminished after Pa-
lazzolo, which held that notice alone would be insufficient grounds  
for barring a takings claim;178 however, Palazzolo did nothing to dis-
pute the impact such “red flags” actually have on both private and 
public expectations.179  The Court reasoned that “[p]rospective en-
actment . . . can limit the value of land without effecting a taking be-
cause it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned.”180  Because the 
“all concerned” in a takings claim encompasses both the landowner 
and the public, the means by which both can most readily judge rea-
sonableness is the physical aspect of the land at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Compensation is a means to achieve justice.181  The legislature 
acts on the public’s behalf when it gives compensation;182 therefore, 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 51. 
 178 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001). 
 179 See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our polestar . . . remains the prin-
ciples set forth in Penn Central itself . . . . [I]nterference with investment-backed ex-
pectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine.”). 
 180 Id. at 627 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 181 Michelman, supra note 47, at 1171–72 (“[T]he only ‘test’ for compensability 
which is ‘correct’ in the sense of being directly responsive to society’s purpose in en-
gaging in a compensation practice is the test of fairness: is it fair to effectuate this so-
cial measure without granting this claim to compensation for private loss thereby in-
flicted?”). 
 182 See, e.g., Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 53 (“A determination that governmental action 
constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather 
than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public 
interest.”). 
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the act of giving must be perceived as fair by the public.183  Fairness, 
in turn, is determined by evaluating the exchange accomplished.184  
The underlying question humming beneath the public inquiry is 
simple: “What are we getting in return for our money?”  Because gov-
ernment is meant to serve the practical purpose of civil ordering, the 
answer should be readily available and obvious.185  A citizen should 
not need to reference abstract rights.186  Linking rationales for dis-
pensing or withholding compensation with actual sensory perception 
can maintain the steady assurance of justice in society. 
In the case of eminent domain, the public has physical and 
prominent proof of the exchange.  The answer to the question, “what 
are we getting,” is the property condemned, available for all to in-
spect.  Further, not only is the physical exchange evidenced, but in 
many cases, the rationale for the purchase is physically manifested 
through construction that benefits the public.  Even in instances of 
controversial conveyances to private entities, the argument and ra-
tionale is played out in the press for public consumption.187  Thus, 
even though a citizen may not agree to the answer given, one is none-
theless provided. 
The exchange in regulatory takings cases is more problematic.  
In cases not involving complete economic wipeout, just compensa-
tion is not accompanied by a reciprocal property interest.  The public 
trust doctrine is an unsatisfactory doctrine in this regard—a private 
landowner does not see fairness in not obtaining compensation for 
his inability to exclude others.  But neither can the public be forced 
 
 183 Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic 
Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 764 (1979) (“Outcomes 
[of property rights disputes] must be rationalized to winners and losers alike in terms 
of a universal property doctrine that society as a whole accepts as just.”). 
 184 This is reflected in the use of a balancing test in less than categorical takings.  
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 185 BURKE, supra note 4, at 53 (“The science of government . . . [is] so practical in 
itself and intended for such practical purposes . . . .”). 
 186 Id.  Edmund Burke aptly notes this point: 
What is the use of discussing a man’s abstract right to food or medi-
cine?  The question is upon the method of procuring and administer-
ing them.  In that deliberation I shall always advise to call in the aid of 
the farmer and the physician rather than the professor of metaphysics. 
Id. 
 187 See, e.g., Steve Chambers, Public Use or Abuse?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Feb. 21, 
2005, at 1 (“In New Jersey, 40 towns have [exercised their power of eminent domain] 
since July 2003 alone, part of a nationwide phenomenon that has angered property 
rights groups.”). 
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to compensate for what nature has taken away (or back).188  Visual 
cues, not only as to nature, but also as to a landowner’s actions, help 
to inform the decision to compensate.  Is the landowner seen as “im-
pos[ing] a restriction on the use of the oceans to promote his activi-
ties on his own land . . . ?”189  Or is the landowner simply trying to do 
what everyone else is doing?190 
The answer is not simple, but in the scholarly pursuit of the 
complicated analysis courts should not overlook the most practical of 
starting points—observation.  This quite literal “first glance” could 
immediately lead to the answer.  If an individual is attempting to 
build where no one else thought to build, or where nature, due to 
the owner’s lack of vigilance, has repossessed, there is a strong visual 
cue of something awry—that perhaps what the landowner claims does 
not “inhere in the title itself.”191  Compensation could then ironically 
become the means of injustice.  By putting forth this proposition, this 
Comment in no way attempts to end the inquiry at visual cues, but 
simply means to emphasize that often the answers to the most com-
plicated questions are those that are easily overlooked, and that in 
some property cases, justice should not be blind. 
 
 
 188 Both State and the Federal governments often have social programs that com-
pensate for natural disasters.  For example, the National Flood Insurance Program 
paid out over $3 billion dollars in disaster relief following Hurricane Hugo in 1989.  
Houck, supra note 19, at 339.  The very existence of these programs has been an-
other rationale for not compensating economic wipeouts resulting from coastal regu-
lations.  Id. (referring to coastal development as “real estate on welfare”). 
 189 Sax, Public Rights, supra note 27, at 160. 
 190 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992) (noting that Lucas’s 
“intention with respect to the lots was to do what the owners of the immediately adja-
cent parcels had already done”). 
 191 Id. at 1029. 
